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Rationality and Indeterminacy
Abstract
Much of the history of game theory has been dominated by the problem of indeterminacy. The very
search for better versions of rationality, as well as the long list of attempts to refine Nash equilibrium, can
be seen as answers to the indeterminacy that has accompanied game theory through its history. More
recently, the experimental approach to game theory has attempted a more radical solution: by directly
generating a stream of behavioral observations, one hopes that behavioral hypotheses will be sharper,
and predictions more accurate. This article looks at several attempts to address indeterminacy, including
the shift to evolutionary models. However, because its goal is to establish whether rational choice models
are inescapably doomed to produce indeterminate outcomes, it pays much more attention to the
experimental turn in game theory, the difficulty it encounters, and the promising results obtained by more
realistic models of rationality that include a social component.
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PART II

MICROECONOMICS

chapter 6

RATIONALITY AND
INDETERMINACY
cristina bicchieri

1. Indeterminacy
Much of the history of game theory has been dominated by the problem of indeterminacy. The very search for better, more encompassing versions of rationality, as
well as the long list of attempts to refine Nash equilibrium, can be seen as answers,
or attempted solutions, to the indeterminacy that has accompanied game theory
through its history. More recently, the experimental approach to game theory
has attempted a more radical solution: by directly generating a stream of behavioral observations, and thus controlling some crucial parameters, one hopes that
behavioral hypotheses will be sharper, and predictions more accurate. I shall look
at several attempts to address indeterminacy, including the shift to evolutionary
models. However, because my goal is to establish whether rational choice models
are inescapably doomed to produce indeterminate outcomes, I will pay much more
attention to the experimental turn in game theory, the difficulty it encounters, and
the promising results obtained by more realistic models of rationality that include
a social component. The sophisticated reader should bear with some initial review
of familiar ideas for the sake of following the historical (and logical) thread, from
early attempts to address indeterminacy out to novel ideas and solutions.
There are at least two kinds of indeterminacy we may want to distinguish.
One, which I will dub epistemic indeterminacy, is something we all have to live
with. Our knowledge of the world is limited, and the outcomes of our choices
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usually are not deterministic; instead, any choice corresponds to several possible
outcomes, each tied to the occurrence of a particular state of the world. Though we
cannot predict which outcome will occur, we can assess the probability with which
the corresponding state of the world will occur and can choose on the basis of this
probabilistic assessment. Rational choice in this context simply means maximizing expected utility, where the subjective utility of an act is the weighted sum of
the desirability of its consequences, and the weights are the probabilities we assess
for each of the possible consequences. Decision theory formalizes all this: It tells
us which strategies are rational, that is, coherent with the subject’s preferences,
with respect to certain and uncertain outcomes, and with her beliefs about all the
variables that are relevant to choice but that she cannot control.
Though we live with epistemic indeterminacy, some form of predictability in
the context of individual decision making is still possible. By predictability I mean
the ability of a third party to predict what sort of action an individual will take.
For example, suppose there are reliable statistical data available and we know our
subject knows them, we know his preferences, and have every reason to believe he
is both practically and epistemically rational.1 In this case, we can in fact predict
what this person will choose. The prediction becomes a little more complicated in
case there are no objective probabilities to rely on, but suppose again that we happen to know a person’s subjective probabilistic assessments. In this case, provided
again that we know that person’s preferences and have every reason to believe
such individual is both practically and epistemically rational, we can predict his
choice.2
This simple model of rational choice has been criticized as too abstract and
demanding: on one end, the amount of knowledge required for third-party predictability is quite extreme, and on the other end, the decision maker is often
unable to even imagine all the possible consequences of her actions, calculate the
probabilities, maximize as the rationality recipe recommends, and so on. What
I want to stress here, however, is not our obvious condition as cognitive misers.
Instead, I want to draw attention to the fact that, even if we were perfect cognitive
machines and/or perfect predictors, there are contexts in which rationality may
not help us make a choice or predict what another’s choice will be. Such contexts
are very common; whenever we interact with other individuals and the outcome of
such interaction depends upon the joint actions of all the parties, we face strategic
indeterminacy.
To act rationally in a strategic context is much more difficult because the consequences of an action depend upon what all the parties involved do. That is, outcomes are jointly determined by the parties’ independent actions. The interactive
decision problem of an agent can be represented in general terms as follows: The
agent will choose a plan of action considering that the consequences of his/her
choice also depend on a combination of unknown and uncontrollable variables,
including other agents’ plans of action. Rephrasing the problem in terms of decision theory, we may say that the agent is rational if she maximizes her expected
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utility, calculated by assigning subjective probabilities to the possible values of
all the relevant variables she cannot control, and taking into account her present information. The fundamental difference between decision theory and game
theory is that the latter tries to explain subjective beliefs using strategic reasoning.
For example, think of a two-player bargaining game in which player I moves
first, and can sell to player II a good for a low price ($1) or a high price ($2). Player
II can accept (yes) or reject (no) I’s proposal; if II rejects, both get 0 (Figure 6.1). I’s
problem is one of maximizing expected utility (in this case, expressed in terms of
money), given what he knows (or believes) about II’s knowledge, preferences, and
beliefs.
Note that how much information is possessed by the players is crucial in determining the outcome, and our knowledge of such information is equally critical in
determining the possibility of predicting what the players will do. Suppose that the
rules of the game and players’ rationality are common knowledge.3 If II is known
to be rational, then I can infer that II will refuse if the price is greater than y, and
accept if the price is lower than y. However, without knowing the value of y, player
I would still be unable to predict II’s response to his offer. If we also assume that
payoffs are common knowledge, then I would know the value of y, predict how II
will react to each offer, and choose accordingly.4 In our case, if I knows that y > 2,
then he expects II to accept both prices. If instead I knows that 1< y< 2, then he
expects II to accept only the low price.
Notice that I’s subjective beliefs about player II’s choices are endogenous. He
infers them from his knowledge of the structure of the game, of player II’s payoffs and rationality. In sum, in a strategic context, what is rational for a player to
do depends upon what he expects other players will do, which in turn is inferred
from the knowledge that a player has about other players and the structure of the
game. Each party to a strategic interaction is at the same time a chooser and a predictor of other parties’ choices. In this case, epistemic and strategic indeterminacy are
entwined.
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2. Nash Predictions
An easy solution to the problem of strategic indeterminacy would be to collapse
it into epistemic indeterminacy: if players’ subjective beliefs were treated as exogenous to the game, other players’ choice profi les would become states of the world
that have a given probability of occurring, and one might just try to maximize
expected utility with respect to those states, bypassing the fact that such states are
determined by what other players believe their counterparts are going to choose.
Is this an interesting solution to strategic indeterminacy? Not if we think that the
notion of Nash equilibrium is important.
Nash equilibrium (Nash 1951) is the standard solution concept for noncooperative games. Informally, a Nash equilibrium specifies players’ actions and beliefs
such that (a) each player’s action is optimal given his beliefs about other players’
choices; (b) players’ beliefs are correct. Thus, an outcome that is not a Nash equilibrium requires either that a player chooses a suboptimal strategy, or that some
players misperceive the situation. More formally, a Nash equilibrium is a vector of
strategies (σ1*,. .,σn*), one for each of the n players in the game, such that each. σi *
is optimal given (or is a best reply to) σ−i *.5
Nash equilibrium is an appealing solution concept for noncooperative games
for several reasons.6 It captures an important feature of individual rationality, that
is, that being rational means maximizing one’s expected utility under the constraint represented by what one expects other individuals to choose. It is supported
by correct beliefs, in the sense that, if players are in equilibrium, their beliefs about
each other’s strategy choice are correct. Finally, the concept of Nash equilibrium
depicts the idea of a self-enforcing agreement. Were players to agree in preplay
negotiation to play a particular strategy combination, they would have an incentive to stick to the agreement only in case the agreed upon combination is a Nash
equilibrium. There are many real-life situations in which there is no third party
available to monitor and enforce compliance with an agreement: many transactions are conducted with a handshake in the expectation that the parties will fulfi ll
their promises. Indeed, when this happens it means that it is in the parties’ interest
to fulfi ll the terms of the agreement, that there is no incentive to unilaterally deviate from it. It means, in other words, that the agreement is a Nash equilibrium.
Game theorists typically assign a predictive value to Nash equilibrium. In a
well-known passage of their book, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944),
von Neumann and Morgenstern said that rational players who know (i) all there
is to know about the structure of the game they are playing, (ii) all there is to
know about the beliefs and motives of the other players, (iii) that every player is
rational, (iv) that every player knows (i)–(iii), (v) that every players knows (i)–(iv),
and so on, will be able to infer the optimal strategy for every player. In that case,
each player will behave rationally by maximizing his expected utility conditional
on what he expects the others to do. This states what could be rightly called the
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central dogma of game theory: that rational players will always jointly maximize
their expected utilities, or play a Nash equilibrium.
Ken Binmore (1987/1988) has argued that there are two possible interpretations
of Nash equilibrium. According to the evolutive interpretation, a Nash equilibrium
is an observed regularity. Players know the equilibrium, and test the rationality of
their behavior given this knowledge acquired from experience. The players (and
the game theorist) can accordingly predict that a given equilibrium will be played,
since they are accustomed to coordinate upon that equilibrium and expect (correctly) others to do the same. According to the more commonly adopted eductive
interpretation, instead, a game is a unique event. In this case it makes sense to ask
whether players can deduce what others will do from the information available
to them. The players (and the game theorist) can predict that an equilibrium will
be played just in case they have enough information to infer players’ choices. The
standard assumptions game theorists make about players’ rationality and knowledge should in principle be sufficient to guarantee that an equilibrium will obtain.
The customary assumptions are:
C(SG + PF). The structure of the game (SG) and players’ preferences (PF)
are common knowledge among the players;
C(Rat). The players are rational (Rat) and this is common knowledge.
When a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, we can predict that it will be played
if we are able to show that players, armed with common knowledge of rationality
and of the structure of the game, will infer the Nash solution. If players have dominated strategies, C(Rat) entails that they will eliminate them, and this is common
knowledge (we assume that the consequences of C(SG + PF) and C(Rat) are common knowledge, too). Often, after we have eliminated strictly dominated strategies for one player, we may find that there are now strictly dominated strategies
for another player, which will be eliminated as well. This process of successive
elimination can continue until there are no more strictly dominated strategies left.
If a unique strategy remains for each player, we say the game has been solved by
iterated dominance. It is easy to prove that a strategy profi le thus obtained is a Nash
equilibrium (Bicchieri 1993).
Common knowledge of rationality, preferences, and strategies may thus
facilitate the task of predicting an opponent’s strategy but, as I argued elsewhere
(Bicchieri 1993), it does not guarantee that the resulting prediction will be correct.
This is because the concept of Nash equilibrium embodies a notion of individual
rationality, since each player’s equilibrium strategy is a best reply to the opponents’ strategies, but, unfortunately, it does not specify how players come to form
the beliefs about each other’s strategies that support equilibrium play. Beliefs, that
is, can be internally consistent but fail to achieve the interpersonal consistency
that guarantees that an equilibrium will be attained. Bernheim (1984) and Pearce
(1984) have argued that assuming players’ rationality (and common knowledge
thereof) can only guarantee that a strategy will be rationalizable, in the sense of
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being supported by internally consistent beliefs about other players’ choices and
beliefs. Yet a combination of rationalizable strategies may not constitute a Nash
equilibrium. On the other hand, the fact that a Nash equilibrium is always a combination of rationalizable strategies is of no help in predicting it will be played.
Consider for a moment the normal form representation of the Figure 6.1
game:
I am assuming here that I knows II’s payoffs, and that y=3. Player II has four
strategies: always accept (yy), always reject (nn), accept if $1, reject if $2 (yn), and
reject if $1 and accept if $2 (ny). For player II, nn is strictly dominated by yy, so C
(Rat) allows I to exclude it (and II knows it). However, all three other strategies
of player II are rationalizable, as well as the two strategies of player I. Moreover,
there are three pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game: (2,yy), (1,yn) and (2, ny),
and no way to predict, by C(Rat) and C(SG+PF), which of them, if any, will be
played.
The refinements of Nash equilibrium program are precisely attempts to eliminate some equilibria as being unreasonable. If we consider again the extensive
form game of Figure 6.1, we can imagine player II threatening to reject if I asks a
high price. This threat is embedded in the equilibrium (1,yn), but is it a credible
threat? Player I knows that y=3 and that II is rational, hence I knows that, faced
with a choice between 0 and 1, II will always choose 1, that is, will always accept
the high price. Thus the (1,yn) equilibrium should be eliminated as unreasonable.
In this case, we have applied the simplest refinement of subgame perfection. Briefly,
a Nash equilibrium s* is perfect if it remains an equilibrium in every proper subgame of the original game G. In our simple example, we can calculate the final
result by backward induction: We take the subgames starting at II’s decision node
and look at the optimal choice for player II. If y=3, the optimal choice for II is to
accept at both subgames. Knowing that, player I will always choose to set a high
price. Another way to look at the same problem is to perturb the game by assuming
that every strategy has a very small probability of being chosen (Selten 1975). So in
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the equilibrium (1,yn) player II is indifferent between yy and yn simply because II
is certain that I will choose 1, the low price. However, if there is a small probability
that I, by mistake, chooses the high price, then yy gives II a higher utility than yn.
The problem with the refinements literature is that it lacks a coherent interpretation of deviations from equilibrium play (Bicchieri 1988, 1993). A deviation may
be a mistake, but it may also be a signal. There is no general model of belief revision
that would include different refinements as special cases of some general, substantive criterion of belief change. Moreover, in order to predict a specific equilibrium
outcome, it must be assumed that players share (and have common knowledge that
they share) the same reasonable principles. Multiplicity of equilibria only aggravates a problem already present in cases in which the equilibrium is unique: the
equilibrium depends on parameters that are not known to an external observer
trying to predict the outcome of the game. Note that, in this case, the players themselves are external observers of their interactive environment who have to guess
what their opponents will do, which in turn depends upon the opponents’ expectations about other players’ choices, and so on.

3. Evolution and Learning
One way to solve strategic indeterminacy is to think in terms of evolution.
Evolutionary models describe aggregate dynamics, without explaining in great
detail how such dynamics are generated by individual behaviors. In fact, individuals in such models are often represented as strategy bearers whose choices are fi xed
or, when they have the possibility of shifting strategies, such shifts are not determined by what they expect others to do but rather by how well they have done in
the past. In such models, a Nash equilibrium is no longer interpreted as a unique
event; it is instead conceived as an observed regularity, about which we want to
know how it was reached and what accounts for its stability. When multiple equilibria are possible, we want to know why players converged to one in particular and
then stayed there. In this case, the selection process is not the result of complicated,
multistage reasoning; it simply results from some form of natural selection.
Evolutionary theories are inspired by population biology (e.g., Maynard Smith
& Price 1973). These theories dispense with the notion of the decision maker, as
well as with best responses/optimization, and use in their place a natural selection,
survival-of-the-fittest process together with mutations to model the frequencies
with which various strategies are represented in the population over time. In a
typical evolutionary model, players are preprogrammed for certain strategies, and
are randomly matched with other players in pairwise repeated encounters. The
relative frequency of a strategy in a population is simply the proportion of players
in that population who adopt it. The theory focuses on how the strategy profi les
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of populations of such agents evolve over time, given that the outcomes of current
games determine the frequency of different strategies in the future. As an example,
consider the symmetric game in Figure 6.3 and suppose that there are only two
possible behavioral types: hawks and doves.
A hawk always fights and escalates contests until it wins or is badly hurt.
A dove sticks to displays and retreats if the opponent escalates the conflict; if it
fights with another dove, they will settle the contest after a long time. Payoffs are
expected changes in fitness due to the outcome of the game. Fitness here means
just reproductive success (e.g., the expected number of offspring per time unit).
Suppose injury has a payoff in terms of loss of fitness equal to C, and victory corresponds to a gain in fitness B. If hawk meets hawk, or dove meets dove, each has
a 50% chance of victory. If a dove meets another dove, the winner gets B and the
loser gets nothing, so the average increase in fitness for a dove meeting another
dove is B/2. A dove meeting a hawk retreats, so her fitness is unchanged, whereas
the hawk gets a gain in fitness B. If a hawk meets another hawk, they escalate until
one wins. The winner has a fitness gain B, the loser a fitness loss C. So the average
increase in fitness is (B-C)/2. The latter payoff is negative, since we assume the cost
of injury is greater than the gain in fitness obtained by winning the contest. We
assume that players will be randomly paired in repeated encounters, and in each
encounter they will play the stage game of Figure 6.3.
If the population were to consist predominantly of hawks, selection would
favor the few doves, since hawks would meet mostly hawks and end up fighting
with an average loss in fitness of (B-C)/2, and 0 > (B-C/2). In a population dominated by doves, hawks would spread, since every time they meet a dove (which
would be most of the time) they would have a fitness gain of B, whereas doves on
average would only get B/2.
Maynard Smith interpreted evolutionary games as something that goes on at
the phenotypic level. The fitness of a phenotype depends on its frequency in the
population. A strategy is a phenotype, and a player is just an instance of such a
behavioral phenotype. In our example, we have only two behavioral phenotypes:
hawks and doves. Evolutionary game theory wants to know how strategies do on
average when games are played repeatedly between individuals who are randomly
drawn from a large population. The average payoff to a strategy depends on the
composition of the population, so a strategy may do very well (in term of fitness) in
one environment and poorly in another. If the frequency of hawks in the popula-
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tion is q and that of doves correspondingly (1-q), the average increase in fitness for
the hawks will be q(B-C)/2+(1-q)B, and (1-q)B/2 for the doves. The average payoff
of a strategy in a given environment determines its future frequency in the population. Strategies that, on average, earn high payoffs in the current environment
are assumed to increase in frequency, and strategies that, on average, earn lower
payoffs are assumed to decrease in frequency. If the average payoffs of the different
strategies are the same, then the composition of the population is stable. In our
example, the average increase in fitness for the hawks will be equal to that for the
doves when the frequency of hawks in the population is q=B/C. At that frequency,
the proportion of hawks and doves is stable. If the frequency of hawks is less that B/
C, then they do better than doves, and will consequently spread; if their frequency
is larger than B/C, they will do worse than doves and will shrink.
Note that if C > B, then (B-C)/2 < 0, so the game in Figure 6.3 has two purestrategy Nash equilibria: (H, D) and (D, H). There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium in which Hawk is played with probability q = B/C and Dove is played with
probability (1-q) = C-B/C. If the game of Figure 6.3 were played by rational agents
who choose which behavior to display, we would be at a loss in predicting their
choices. We know that from C(SG + PF) and C(Rat) the players cannot infer that
a particular equilibrium will be played; moreover, since there are no dominated
strategies, all possible outcomes are rationalizable. In our hawk/dove example,
however, players are not rational and do not choose their strategies. So if an equilibrium is attained, it must be the outcome of some process very different from
rational deliberation. The process at work is natural selection: High-performing
strategies increase in frequency whereas low-performing strategies diminish in
frequency and eventually go to zero.
The mechanism is quite simple: the bearer of a successful behavioral trait
will have more offspring than the bearer of a less successful trait, and each of the
descendants will display the same behavioral trait, hence the frequency increase.
This is an extremely simplified and probably wrong story of how behavioral traits
are transmitted among humans. We have no evidence for the genetic transmission
of behavioral traits such as altruism, selfishness, or the tendency to escalate conflicts. There is instead evidence that such traits are culturally transmitted, and a
realistic model of how a specific behavioral pattern becomes dominant in a population should, therefore, include a description of how individuals learn behavioral
patterns and imitate those who are successful.
We have seen that in a population composed mostly of doves, hawks will thrive,
and the opposite would occur in a population composed mainly of hawks. So, for
example, if hawks dominate the population, a mutant displaying dove behavior
can invade the population, since individuals bearing the dove trait will do better than hawks. The main solution concept used in evolutionary game theory is
the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) introduced by Maynard Smith and Price
(1973). A strategy or behavioral trait is evolutionarily stable if, once it dominates
in the population, it does strictly better than any mutant strategy, hence it cannot
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be invaded. To formalize this concept, let me first make a brief digression. In a
symmetric game like hawk/dove, we have a finite set of pure strategies S and a corresponding set ∆ of mixed strategies. A population state is equivalent to a mixed
strategy x Î.∆. Note that the evolutionary model gives a natural interpretation to
mixed strategies as the proportions of certain strategies (or traits) in a population. A state in which each individual plays a pure strategy and the proportion of
different strategies correspond to x is called a polymorphic state. Alternatively,
we may interpret the population state x as monomorphic, in the sense that each
player plays the mixed strategy x. In a two-player game, being matched against a
randomly drawn individual in population state x is equivalent to being matched
against an individual who plays the mixed strategy x. Hence the average payoff of
playing strategy y in population state x is equal to the expected payoff to y when
played against the mixed strategy x, that is, u(y,x). The population average in this
case is equal to the expected payoff of the mixed strategy x when matched against
itself, that is, u(x,x).
In a symmetric, two-player game, x is an ESS if and only if, for all y Î.∆ such that
y ≠ x,
(1) u(x,x) > u(y,x)
or
(2) u(x,x) = u(y,x), and u(x,y) > u(y,y).
Condition (1) tells us that strategy x is a unique best reply against itself. If the
bulk of the population consists of type x and a small number of mutants of type y
enters the population, if x does better against x than y does against x, y will be less fit
and disappear. However, if x is a mixed strategy, we know (1) does not hold. In this
case, for x to be an ESS, (2) must hold. If both x and y perform equally well against
x, then y will be less fit than x if x does better against y than y does against y.
In the hawk/dove game, neither of the two pure behavioral types is evolutionarily stable, since each can be invaded by the other. We know, however, that
a population in which there is a proportion q = B/C of hawks and (1-q) = C-B/C
of doves is stable. This means that the type of behavior that consists in escalating
fights with probability q = B/C cannot be invaded by any other type, hence it is an
ESS. To show that the mixed strategy x = (B/C, C-B/C) is an ESS, we have to show
that condition (2) is satisfied. Indeed, u(x,y)- u(y,y) = 1/2C (B-Cq)2 is greater than
zero for all q ≠
. B/C.
An ESS is a strategy that, when it dominates the population, is a best reply
against itself. Therefore, an evolutionarily stable strategy such as (B/C, C-B/C) is
a Nash equilibrium. Though every ESS is a Nash equilibrium, the reverse does
not hold; in our stage game, there are three Nash equilibria, but only the mixed
strategy equilibrium (B/C, C-B/C) is an ESS. However, when a strategy is a unique
best reply to itself, it is both an ESS and a strict Nash equilibrium. In this special
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case, the reverse also holds: Every strict Nash equilibrium is an ESS. In a strict
equilibrium, there exists no other strategy that is an alternative best reply to the
equilibrium strategy, and this guarantees noninvadability.
The prior examples show how evolution can at least partially solve the problem
of equilibrium selection without imposing heroic cognitive requirements on players. An ESS is, in fact, not just a Nash equilibrium but also a perfect and proper
equilibrium (Van Damme 1987). Furthermore, an evolutionary account of how a
Nash equilibrium is achieved provides an explanation of the dynamics of the selection process, something which the refinement program cannot do. In the hawk/dove
example, we have assumed that the success of a strategy depends on the outcome of
pair-wise random matches. It is often the case that a strategy’s success depends not
on the strategy played by a particular opponent, but on the population-wide frequencies of strategies. When examining behavior in a population game, we adopt the
concept of an evolutionarily stable state (also ESS) (Hofbauer & Sigmund 1998).
Suppose the game has N pure strategies, with an NxN symmetric expected
payoff matrix A=(aij). There is an infinite number of players, and each player initially commits to playing exactly one of the N pure strategies. Let p be the N × 1
vector denoting the population-wide proportion of each of the N strategies (player
types) in the population at a given time. Let
f i( p) =∑ aij p j =Ai p
j

denote the fitness of strategy i and let ∑ f i ( p) = Ap. denote the population-wide
i
payoff. The population-wide weighted average
fitness value is pT Ap. We say that p̂ is
an evolutionarily stable state if for any p ≠ p̂ in the neighborhood of p̂, we have:
p̂T Ap > pT Ap
This captures the idea that the population-wide payoff under p̂ is higher
(locally) than for any other vector p.7
The definitions of evolutionarily stable strategies or states are static. To describe
the dynamic process that leads to a certain distribution of strategies in a population, we have models of the selection dynamics that express the growth rate of a
strategy i in population state p as a function of i’s average payoff in p relative to the
average payoff to other strategies in p. Evolutionarily stable state does not refer to
a specific dynamic, but biologists and evolutionary game theorists frequently use
deterministic replicator dynamics (Taylor & Jonker 1978) of the form:
(∗) pi(t + 1) =

pi(t )Ai p(t )
,
pT (t )Ap(t )

where p(t) denotes the population-wide proportions at time t, the denominator is a
measure of average strategy fitness in the population at t, and the numerator measures
the fitness of strategy i at time t. Strategies with above-average fitness see their proportions increase, and those with below-average fitness see their proportions decrease.8
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ESS are asymptotically stable fi xed points of this replicator dynamic, though
the converse need not be true (see, e.g., Samuelson 1997). A similar relationship
holds between the replicator dynamic and Nash equilibria: if p̂ is a Nash equilibrium of the symmetric NxN game with expected payoff matrix A, then p̂ is a
stationary state of the replicator dynamic.
In evolutionary theory replication, variation and heredity are the basic assumptions. Any entity capable of replicating itself with differential success will be subject
to an evolutionary process. Differential success, in turn, is related to hereditary variations. In biology, replicators are genes and in genetic evolution, variation is provided
by random mutations and recombinations of gene sequences. Behavioral patterns can
be replicators, too, in the sense that behavioral trait x is replicated when a gene x that
predisposes its carriers to behave according to this pattern replicates itself. This means
that bearers of gene x will behave in ways that make them reproductively successful,
so that in the next generation there will be more copies of x. To the extent that behavior x promotes the replication of its predisposing gene, we are correct in saying that
the behavior is replicating itself. Individuals are just bearers of such genetic material,
hence they are born with fixed behavioral traits. Variation of competing strategies is
provided by random mutations and recombinations of gene sequences.
When we think of strategies, however, we usually refer to behaviors that are
not genetically inherited. In economic and political applications of game theory,
actors can be firms, political parties, nations. Even when actors are individuals,
their strategies have a strong cultural component. Evolutionary models can still
be applied to explain how Nash equilibria are attained and whether they are stable, but selection mechanisms in this case work through processes of cultural
transmission such as learning and imitation. Learning and imitation are subject to mistakes, and new strategies may enter the population either by random
mistake or by purposeful innovation. For example, we tend to imitate successful
individuals, where success is measured in terms of some shared values. Since it is
usually difficult to point to one particular behavior as responsible for successful
performance, what is imitated will often consist of a set of behavioral rules, and
this in turn may generate mistakes. Payoffs in this case cannot represent fitness
changes, but if we give them a utility interpretation, we must provide for interpersonal comparisons of utilities. Indeed, to imitate a more successful individual,
one must be able to compare one’s payoffs with the payoffs of others, but traditional von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities do not allow for such comparisons.
Evolutionary games provide us with a way of explaining how agents that may
or may not be rational and—if so—subject to severe information and calculation
restrictions, achieve and sustain a Nash equilibrium. When there exist evolutionarily stable strategies (or states), we know which equilibrium will obtain, without the need to postulate refinements in the way players interpret off-equilibrium
moves. Yet we need to know much more about processes of cultural transmission,
and to develop adequate ways to represent payoffs, so that the promise of evolutionary games is actually fulfi lled.
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An alternative to a traditional evolutionary model is a learning model. By learning, we mean a mechanism by which a player’s present choice depends on previous
experience, which in interactive environments includes the choices made by other
players. In learning models, players may be endowed with small or large memories, and be as sophisticated as we want them to be. Some such models assume that
players only look at past actions and outcomes, and choose more frequently those
actions that are associated to higher payoffs. In this case, we are far from the traditional model of rational choice, and the problem of strategic indeterminacy does
not arise. Other models, however, assume that players are also forward-looking; at
every stage of the game, players make probabilistic conjectures on the opponents’
strategies, and then they maximize expected utility on the basis of such conjectures.
Though players are usually assumed to ignore the effects that their own choices
have on their opponents’ future choices, they are endowed with belief-revision
capabilities and modify their conjectures on the basis of their observations of how
the opponents have played. It can be proved that, in the long run, if a learning
dynamics converges (and thus players’ subjective probabilistic assessments coincide with the observed frequencies), the limit is a Nash equilibrium (Fudenberg &
Levine 1998). Clearly, in any learning model, observation of other players’ choices
is crucial. But what does a player observe? Suppose a simultaneous-move game
is played repeatedly. After each stage game, since actions and strategies coincide,
what a player observes are the opponents’ strategies (single uncontingent actions).
It is worthwhile to note that in such models one need not assume complete information or common knowledge of rationality. What is important to assume is that
players are epistemically rational in a weak sense: their beliefs must be internally
consistent, and belief revision is done according to Bayes rule. Strategic indeterminacy seems to be resolved in that, when a successful learning process will lead the
players to a Nash equilibrium, such equilibrium can reproduce indefinitely, and
thus players’ predictions about each other’s actions turn out to be accurate.
The problem with these kinds of models is that most of the interactions we
want to represent are dynamic ones. In a dynamic game, players only observe the
terminal nodes that are reached in that play of the game, not the parts of their
opponents’ strategies that specify how they would have played at information sets
in unreached parts of the tree. Thus players cannot observe their opponents’ strategies, since, in this case, a strategy does not coincide with an action. Note that a
strategy is a complete, contingent plan of action that tells a player how to behave
in all sorts of circumstances (i.e., at every information set). In a dynamic game, it
is impossible to tell how an opponent would have played in circumstances that did
not occur; all that can be observed are the actions performed during the game. The
problem here is that a conjecture can be compatible with what is observed, but it
may be wrong. Consider again the game in Figure 6.1. Suppose player I believes,
for whatever reason, that player II would only buy for a low price. In this case, the
optimal choice for player I would be to ask for a low price, and if II accepts, players will be locked in the outcome (1, y). Player I will have no reason to change his
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initial conjecture, and will never be able to know how II would have reacted to a
higher price. In this case, the outcome (1, y) is compatible with the Nash equilibrium (1, yn), but yn might not be the strategy chosen by II.
What we are facing here is an interesting twist: Players can learn to correctly
predict the outcome of the game, and thus reproduce it indefinitely, even if they are
wrong about each others’ strategies. In fact, players can even generate stable outcomes that are incompatible with Nash equilibrium. Fudenberg and Levine (1998)
did show that there are situations in which each player chooses a best reply to her
conjecture, and that conjecture is compatible with the pattern of play she observes,
but the self-confirming equilibria thus obtained are not Nash equilibria.
The conclusions we can draw for strategic indeterminacy are not reassuring.
On the one hand, we have seen that, in the context of common knowledge of SG,
PF and Rat, strategic indeterminacy can be resolved only by endowing players with
an unrealistic load of extra information (and common knowledge thereof). For
example, players would have to have common knowledge of how to interpret deviations from the equilibrium path, have a common understanding of how to prioritize within a hierarchy of possible interpretations, have common priors about
players’ types, and so on. Note that in this case we resolve strategic indeterminacy
by completely eliminating epistemic indeterminacy. Only in these circumstances
Nash predictions can be made by the theorist and the players. If instead we abandon
full rationality and information in favor of an evolutionary approach, Nash equilibrium can be justified as the outcome of a process of natural selection. In this case,
we have completely bypassed the problem of strategic indeterminacy, since players
have no need to reason to an equilibrium. Finally, learning models cast doubt on the
possibility of predicting Nash equilibria. Limited observability of players’ actions
may prevent convergence to a stationary state, and even with observability, dynamic
games may converge to stable and stationary states that are not Nash equilibria.

3. Experiments
As we shall see next, the experimental approach, by controlling the rules of the
game, the monetary payoffs, and the amount of knowledge players have about these
parameters, seems at first sight a viable solution to the problem of indeterminacy.
Observations about players’ behavior are generated in the laboratory, where the
experimenter can control the game description, the order of moves, players’ information about earlier moves, the outcomes and their relation with players’ moves,
as well as players’ knowledge of all of the above. However, since players’ preferences
over outcomes cannot be easily controlled, the experimenter will have to make
hypotheses about players’ preferences, and about players’ knowledge about each
other’s preferences. Only in this case we will be able to make predictions about the
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outcome of the game. When experimental economists started testing the prediction that players converge to a Nash equilibrium, the default auxiliary hypotheses
were that players only have selfish preferences over monetary outcomes, and that
this fact is common knowledge among them. The falsification of many such predictions in a variety of games has led some to claim that Nash equilibrium theory has
been falsified, but all that was falsified are the auxiliary hypotheses about players’
preferences and common knowledge thereof. The challenge now is to make new,
better hypotheses about players’ utilities, hypotheses that are general enough to
explain the results of a variety of experiments, and are specific enough to allow for
meaningful predictions. To illustrate the difficulties and potential pitfalls of the
new approach, as well as the consequences for the indeterminacy problem, I shall
now turn to a well known experimental game that has engaged both theorists and
experimentalists in an attempt to make sense of the unexpected results.
In 1982, Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze published a study in which they
asked subjects to play what is now known as an Ultimatum bargaining game. Their
goal was to test the predictions of game theory about equilibrium behavior. Their
results instead showed that subjects consistently deviate from what game theory
predicts. To understand what game theory predicts, and why, let us consider a typical Ultimatum game. Two people must split a fi xed amount of money M according
to the following rules: the proposer (P) moves first and offers a division of M to
the responder (R), where the offer can range between M and zero. The responder
has a binary choice in each case: to accept the offer or to reject it. If the offer is
accepted, the proposer receives M-x and the responder receives x, where x is the
offer amount. If the offer is rejected, each player receives nothing. If rationality
(and self-interest) are common knowledge, the proposer knows that the responder
will always accept any amount greater than zero, because Accept dominates Reject
for any offer greater than zero. Hence proposer should offer the minimum amount
guaranteed to be accepted, and responder will accept it. For example, if M = $10
and the minimum available amount is 1 cent, the proposer should offer it and the
offer should be accepted, leaving the proposer with $9.99. This is the result predicted by perfect equilibrium theory.
Experiments find, however, that nobody offers 1 cent or even 1 dollar. Note
that such experiments are always one-shot and anonymous. That is, subjects play
the game only once with an anonymous partner and are guaranteed that their
choice will not be disclosed. The absence of repetition is important to distinguish
between generous behavior that is dictated by a rational, selfish calculation and
genuine generosity. If an Ultimatum game is repeated with the same partner, or
if a player suspects that future partners will know of her past behavior, it may be
perfectly rational for players who are only interested in their material payoff to give
generously, if they expect to be on the receiving side at a future time. On the other
hand, a Receiver who might accept the minimum in a one-shot game might want
to reject a low offer at the beginning of a repeated game, in the hope of convincing
future proposers to offer more.

UNCORRECTED PROOF

174

microeconomics

In the United States, as well as in a number of other countries, the modal
and median offers in one-shot experimental games are 40% to 50% of the total
amount, and the mean offers are 30% to 40%. Offers below 20% are rejected about
half the time.9 These results are robust with respect to variations in the amount of
money that is being split, and cultural differences (Camerer 2003). For example,
we know that raising the stakes from $10 to $100 does not decrease the frequency
of rejections of low offers (those between $10 and $20), and that in experiments
run in Slovenia, Pittsburgh, Israel, and Tokyo, the modal offers were in the range
of 40% to 50% (Hoffman et al. 1998; Roth et al. 1991).
If we go by the default assumption that players only value their monetary outcomes, then we must conclude that the prediction that players will choose the perfect equilibrium has been falsified. However, as I already mentioned, what has been
falsified are the auxiliary hypotheses about players’ preferences (and their common
knowledge of such preferences). Individuals’ behavior across games suggests that
money is not the sole consideration, and instead there is a concern for fairness, so
much so that subjects are prepared to punish at a cost to themselves those that behave
in inequitable ways.10 A concern for fairness is just one example of a more general fact
about human behavior: we are often motivated by a host of factors of which monetary incentives are one, and often not the most important. When faced with different
possible distributions, we usually care about how we fare with respect to others, how
the distribution came about, who implemented it, and why. The variety of reasons
we have for behaving one way or another should be incorporated into a utility function, and economists have recently started to develop richer, more complex models
of human behavior that try to explain what we have always known: We do care about
other people’s outcomes. Thus a better way to explain what is observed in experiments is to provide a richer definition of rationality: People still maximize their utilities, but the arguments of their utility functions include other people’s utilities.
In what follows, I will look at two possible explanations for the generous distributions we observe in Ultimatum games. There is no room here to provide a
detailed account of how to test these explanations against some interesting variations of the game, and the reader is referred to the relevant literature.11 I want only
to note that such testing is not always easy to conduct. The problem is that we
still have quite rudimentary theories of how motives affect behavior. And to test
a hypothesis about what sort of motives induce us to act one way or another, we
have to be very specific in defining such motives, and the ways in which they influence our choices. In the Ultimatum game, the uniformity of responders’ behavior
suggests that people do not like being treated unfairly. That is, if subjects perceive
an offer of 20% or 30 of the money as unfair, they may reject it to “punish” the
greedy proposer, even at a cost to themselves.12 One possible hypothesis we may
make is that both proposers and responders are showing a social preference for fair
outcomes, or an aversion to inequality.13 If we make this hypothesis, we can still
explain the experimental results with a traditional rational choice model, where
the agents’ preferences take into account the payoffs of others.
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In models of inequality aversion, players prefer both more money and that allocations be more equal. Though there are several models of inequality aversion, perhaps the best known and most extensively tested is the model of Fehr and Schmidt
(1999). This model intends to capture the idea that people may be uneasy, to a certain
extent, about the presence of inequality, even if they benefit from the unequal distribution. Given a group of L persons, the Fehr-Schmidt utility function of person i is
U i(x1 ,..., x L ) = xi −

ai
L −1

bi

∑ max(x − x , 0)− L − 1 ∑ max(x − x , 0)
j

i

i

j

j

j

where xj denotes the material payoff that person j gets. αi ÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ is a parameter
that measures how much player i dislikes disadvantageous inequality (an “envy”
weight), and βiÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ measures how much i dislikes advantageous inequality (a
“guilt” weight).14 One constraint on the parameters is that 0< βiÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ < αiÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ,
which indicates that people dislike advantageous inequality less than disadvantageous inequality. The other constraint is βiÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ < 1, so that agents do not suffer terrible guilt when they are in relatively good positions. For example, a player
would prefer getting more without affecting other people’s payoff, even though
that results in an increase of the inequality.
Applying the model to the Ultimatum game I just described, the utility function is simplified to
⎧a i (x3−i − xi ) if x3−i ≥ xi
U i (x1 , x2 ) = xi − ⎨
⎩ bi (xi − x3−i ) if x3−i < xi

i = 1, 2

Obviously if the responder rejects the offer, both utility functions are equal to zero,
that is, U1reject = U2reject = 0. If the responder accepts an offer of x, the utility functions are as follows:
⎧(1 + a1 )M − (1 + 2a1 )x if x ≥ M / 2
U1accept (x) = ⎨
⎩ (1 − b1 )M − (1 − 2b1 )x if x < M / 2
⎧ (1 + 2a 2 )x − a 2 M if x < M / 2
U 2 accept (x) = ⎨
⎩ (1 − 2b1 )x + b2 M if x ≥ M / 2
The responder should accept the offer if and only if U2accept (x) > U2reject = 0. Solving
for x, we get the threshold for acceptance: x > α2M/(1+2α2ÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ). Evidently if
α2ÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ is close to zero, which indicates that player 2 (R) does not care much
about being treated unfairly, the responder will accept very mean offers. On the
other hand, if α2ÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ is sufficiently big, the offer has to be close to half to be
accepted. In any event, the threshold is not higher than M/2, which means that
hyper-fair offers (more than half) are not necessary for the sake of acceptance.
Note that for the proposer, the utility function is monotonically decreasing
in x when x ≥ M/2. Hence a rational proposer will not offer more than half of

UNCORRECTED PROOF

176

microeconomics

the money. Suppose x ≤ M/2; two cases are possible depending on the value of
β1ÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ. If β1ÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ>1/2, that is, if the proposer feels sufficiently guilty about
treating others unfairly, the utility is monotonically increasing in x, and his best
choice is to offer M/2. On the other hand, if β1ÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ<1/2, the utility is monotonically decreasing in x, and hence the best offer for the proposer is the minimum one
that would be accepted, i.e. (a little bit more than) α2MÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ(1+2α2ÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ).
Lastly, if β1ÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ=1/2, it does not matter how much the proposer offers, as long
as it is between α2MÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ(1+2α2ÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ) and M/2. Note that the other two
parameters, a1 ÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔand β2ÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ, are not identifiable in Ultimatum games.
As noted by Fehr and Schmidt, the model allows for the fact that individuals are
heterogeneous. Different αÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ’s and βÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ’s correspond to different
types of people. Although the utility functions are common knowledge, the exact
values of the parameters are not. The proposers, in most cases, is not sure what type
of responders they are facing. Along the Bayesian line, her belief about the type
of the responder can be formally represented by a probability distribution P on
α2ÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ and β2ÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ. When β1ÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ>1/2, the proposer’s rational
choice does not depend on what P is. When β1ÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ<1/2, however, the proposer will seek to maximize the expected utility:
EU(x)=P(a2M/(1+2a2) < x)×((1–b1)M–(1–2b1)x)
Therefore, the behavior of a rational proposer in the Ultimatum game is determined by her own type (β1ÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ) and her belief about the type of the responder.
The experimental data suggest that for many proposers, either βÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ is big
(βÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ>1/2), or they estimate the responder’s αÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ to be large. The choice
of the responder is only determined by his type (α2ÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ) and the offer. Small
offers are rejected by responders with a positive αÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ.
The positive features of the Fehr-Schmidt utility function are that it can rationalize both positive and negative outcomes, and that it can explain the observed variability in outcomes with heterogeneous types. One of the major weaknesses of their
model, however, is that it has a consequentialist bias. Players only care about final
distributions of outcomes, not about how such distributions come about. However,
recent experiments have established that how a situation is framed matters to an
evaluation of outcomes, and that the same distribution can be accepted or rejected
depending on “irrelevant” information about the players or the circumstances of
play (Bicchieri 2006; Camerer 2003). Another difficulty with this approach is that,
if we assume the distribution of types to be constant in a given population, then
we should observe, overall, the same proportion of fair outcomes in Ultimatum
games. Not only this does not happen, but we also observe individual inconsistencies in behavior across different situations in which the monetary outcomes are the
same. If we assume that individual preferences are stable, then we would expect
similar behaviors across Ultimatum games. If instead we conclude that preferences
are context-dependent, then we should provide a mapping from contexts to preferences that indicates in a fairly predictable way how and why a given context or
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situation changes one’s preferences. Of course, different situations may change a
player’s expectation about another player’s envy or guilt parameters, and we could
thus explain why a player may change her behavior, depending on how the situation
is framed. In the case of Fehr and Schmidt’s utility function, however, experimental
evidence implies that a player’s own β (or α) changes value in different situations
(Bicchieri 2006, Chapter 3). Yet nothing in their theory explains why one would feel
consistently more or less guilty (or envious) depending on the decision context.

4. Norms and Expectations
To make clear what I mean, let us consider the results of a questionnaire distributed to 100 Carnegie Mellon undergraduate students that depicted three situations
in which the payoffs were the same, but the descriptions of the situation significantly differed.15
1. Imagine you must choose how to allocate $10 between yourself and person Y,
whom you don’t know. You must allocate the money in one of two ways:
A. You and person Y both get $0
B. You get $2 and person Y gets $8
82% of the students choose B, (2, 8).
2. In this scenario, you can offer whatever you want, but Y lets you know that she
wants to be offered more than $5. Y announces that you must offer $8 (and keep
$2) or she will reject the offer. To prove this to you, Y takes a “commitment pill”
that will biologically compel her to reject any offer of less than $8.
A. You keep more than $2 of the $10 for yourself and Y rejects—both you
and Y get $0
B. You offer to keep only $2 of the $10 and Y accepts—you get $2 and Y gets $8
Only 49% of the students choose B (2, 8).
3. In this scenario, Y wants to be offered more than $5. Y lives on an island with a different culture, but where the people are of similar wealth to you. In Y’s culture, the “last
mover” is perceived as the person who controls this game, and is expected to get more
of the money. An anthropologist, who will phone your offer to Y, informs you that in
Y’s culture, any offer less than $8 is viewed as insulting. If you do not offer the split $2,
$8, Y will reject your offer. The anthropologist tells you that if the roles were reversed,
Y would offer you $8. There is no anthropologist telling Y what you think is fair.
Here 63 percent of the students choose B (2, 8).
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Note that all these choices are consequentially equivalent: either both parties
get 0, or we have a (2,8) distribution. As I argued before, most models of social preference are consequentialist, but the results I am reporting show that people assign
a value to the process through which the outcome is obtained.16 The (2,8) outcome
in the “commitment pill” choice is clearly less attractive; here the responder is
rejecting potentially fair offers and, by taking the pill, has given herself an unfair
advantage.17
In the anthropologist scenario, the responder obeys a different rule, and
doesn’t know you don’t know it. Moreover, it is clear that the rule is symmetrical:
Were the responder in the proposer’s role, he would just keep $2. If we consider the
three cases, and the students’ responses, it seems that what makes the difference is
the presence (or absence) of social norms that can be violated, and violation consistently elicits a negative reaction in a majority of participants.
The first case presents a simple choice. Only a person with a strong aversion
to inequality would choose the (0, 0) outcome, and lose $2. Such people exist, but
their number is quite small. Because there is no clear rule about how to behave, the
(2, 8) outcome seems the obvious choice. The second case instead is one in which
Y is patently unfair, and the majority of students choose to punish him, at a cost to
themselves. The last case is one in which a different norm is at work, and thus the
receiver who expects $8 is not seen as greedy or manipulative.
If a person has a strong aversion to inequitable outcomes, the number of rejections should stay the same, irrespective of the description of the situation. But the
above examples and many experimental results show that this is not the case; most
people are extremely sensitive to the way a situation is framed, and when fairness
is at stake, many will choose to punish transgressions at a cost to themselves.18
Preferences, that is, are conditional on the decision context. But what exactly maps
a context into a specific interpretation that involves, among other things, expectations, beliefs, and causal attributions about other people’s motives and future
behaviors? I have argued elsewhere (Bicchieri 2006, Chapter 2) that we interpret
any situation we are in, and especially new ones, according to scripts that represent
stored, generic knowledge about classes of situations. We have scripts that describe
what happens at parties, lectures, family reunions, party meetings, and so on. Such
scripts contain roles, sequence of actions rules, beliefs and expectations regarding individuals’ roles, as well as prescriptions for unexpected occurrences. Scripts
are typically shared within a given culture, and, indeed, what is apparent from
a variety of experiments is that individuals share a common understanding and
interpretation of the experimental situation and the kind of behavior that is most
appropriate in those circumstances.19 Social norms, I have argued, are embedded
into scripts. In the typical Ultimatum game, once a fair division script is activated, players will have definite beliefs about what the proposer should offer, especially if they do not have any specific information about him. If a fairness norm is
prompted, not only will one expect to get a fair share, but one will be ready to attribute an unfair share to the greediness of the proposer, feel outraged, and retaliate.

UNCORRECTED PROOF

rationality and indeterminacy

179

Since script activation involves activation of the appropriate expectations and
beliefs, the expectations subjects have about what others do in the same situation,
as well as about what they believe is expected of them, play an important role in
guiding their choices. The majority of individuals do not show a consistent disposition to behave in a cooperative, trusting, or fair way. People do not punish
transgressors in all circumstances, nor do they positively reciprocate in all cases in
which reciprocation is a possible choice. Rather, individuals change their behavior
according to the way the situation is framed, which in turn generates very different expectations about what other individuals similarly situated would do, as well
as beliefs about what one is expected to do in such situations. Experimental data
show that such expectations, when elicited, are interpersonally consistent, and
I want to argue that the social norms that generate them are key to understanding
experimental behavior and can offer a solution to the indeterminacy problem.
My definition of social norm (see Appendix) is different from the traditional sociological ones, in that I understand a social norm to be a behavioral rule that is supported
by (and consists of) the empirical and normative expectations of those who abide by it.
People, I have argued, have a conditional preference for following a norm, provided their
expectations are met (Bicchieri 2006, Chapter 1). In an Ultimatum game, for example,
the proposer will have an incentive to be fair if she believes the responder expects a fair
share, and in the absence of any other information that is precisely what most proposers expect. Note that I am not assuming the proposer wants or prefers to be fair, unconditionally. Surely there are such individuals, but we need not count on them to have fair
distributions. It is enough to assume that most individuals conditionally prefer to be
fair given that they believe that (a) others typically behave in a fair way, and (b) they are
expected to choose a fair division. Whether their motive is fear of retaliation or just the
recognition of others’ legitimate expectations is not relevant to the present discussion.
The norm-based utility function I introduced in (2006) can now be applied to
the Ultimatum game. Let πiÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ be the payoff function for player i. The normbased utility function of player i depends on the strategy profi le s, and is given by
U i (s) = p i (s) − ki max

s− j ∈L− j

max{p m (s− j , N j (s− j )) − p m (s), 0}
m≠ j

where ki ≥ 0 is a constant representing i’s sensitivity to the relevant norm. Such sensitivity may vary with different norms; for example, a person may be very sensitive
to equality and much less so to equity considerations. The first maximum operator
takes care of the possibility that the norm instantiation (and violation) might be
ambiguous in the sense that a strategy profi le instantiates a norm for several players simultaneously (as would be the case, for example, in a social dilemma with
three players). The second maximum operator ranges over all the players other
than the norm violator. In plain words, the discounting term (multiplied by ki) is
the maximum payoff deduction resulting from all norm violations.
In the traditional Ultimatum game, the norm usually prescribes a fair amount
the proposer ought to offer. The norm functions that represent this norm are the
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following: N1 is a constant N function, and N2 is nowhere defined.20 If the responder
rejects, the utilities of both players are zero.
U1reject (x)=U2reject (x)=0
Given that the proposer offers x and the responder accepts, the utilities are the
following:
U1accept (x) = M − x − k1 max(N 1 − x , 0)
U 2 accept (x) = x − k2 max(N 2 − x , 0)
where Ni denotes the amount player i thinks he should get/offer according to some
social norm applicable to the situation, and ki is non-negative. Note that k1 measures
how much player 1 dislikes to deviate from what he takes to be the norm. To obey
a norm, sensitivity to the norm need not be high. Fear of retaliation may make a
proposer with a low k behave according to what fairness dictates but, absent such
risk, his disregard for the norm will lead him to be unfair. I assume here it is common knowledge that N1 = N2 = N, which is reasonable in the traditional Ultimatum
game. Again, the responder should accept the offer if and only if U2accept(x) > U2reject
= 0, which implies the following threshold for acceptance: x > k2N/(1+k2). Notice that
an offer larger than the norm dictates is not necessary for the sake of acceptance.
For the proposer, the utility function is decreasing in x when x ≥ N, hence a
rational proposer will not offer more than N. Suppose x £ N. If k1 >1, the utility
function is increasing in x, which means that the best choice for the proposer is to
offer N. If k1 < 1, the utility function is decreasing in x, which implies that the best
strategy for the proposer is to offer the least amount that would result in acceptance, that is, a little bit more than the threshold k2N/(1+k2). If k1 =1, it does not
matter how much the proposer offers, provided the offer is between k2N/(1+k2)
and N.
It should be noted that k1 plays a very similar role as that of b1ÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ in the
Fehr-Schmidt model. In fact, if we take N to be M/2 and k1 to be 2b1ÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ, the
two models agree on what the proposer’s utility is. It is equally apparent that k2
in this model is analogous to α2ÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ in the Fehr-Schmidt model. There is,
however, an important difference between these parameters. The αÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ’s and
βÔÔΙÔÔÔÔΙÔÔ’s in the Fehr-Schmidt model measure people’s degree of aversion toward
inequality, which is a very different disposition than the one measured by the k‘s,
that is, people’s sensitivity to different norms. The latter will usually be a stable
disposition, and behavioral changes may thus be caused by changes in focus or
in expectations. A theory of norms can explain such changes, whereas a theory of
inequity aversion does not.
It is also the case that the proposer’s belief about the responder’s type figures in
her decision when k1 < 1. The belief can be represented by a joint probability over k2
and N2, if the value of N2 is not common knowledge. The proposer should choose
an offer that maximizes the expected utility
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EU (x) = P(k2 N 2 /(1 + k2 ) < x)× (M − x − k1 (N 1 − x)).
If we now apply the above utility function to the questionnaire we just discussed, it is reasonable to assume that in the Ultimatum game the norm prescribes
(5, 5) offers, and the proposer should thus never expect to keep less than 5. Her
choice in the pill scenario is whether to induce rejection or accept $2:
U 1reject (x) =0
U 1accept (x) = 2 − k1 (5 − 2)
If k1 > 2/3, reject is the utility-maximizing choice. In the anthropologist scenario instead, the conditions for obeying the (5, 5) norm fail: the responder neither
knows the rule nor expects the proposer to follow it. Actually, the relevant norm is
(2, 8). The discounting term drops out and it is again preferable to offer 8.
Consider once more the game in Figure 6.1. Let us suppose that it represents a
situation in which, for whatever reason, low price is the norm. In this case, even if
player I does not know the value of y, she knows that player II will reject an offer of
2 for any y > 2 and k II > 1.21 Player I is thus playing a Bayesian game in which player
II can be one of different types.22 However, his prior probabilities are influenced by
the norm’s existence. The norm points to the equilibrium (1, yn) and, in case the
norm is de facto followed in the population, player I will have good reason to assess
a high probability to kII > 1. Note that assessing the k of player II is crucial even if
I were to know the value of y. For example, if y=3 and in the absence of a norm,
player I would most certainly choose the high price. The presence of a norm, however, drastically changes the situation, since now player I has to assess the probability that II cares about the norm. In this case, it is better for player I to choose the
low price, even if he personally does not care that much about following the norm.
Expectations, in other words, are crucial to our decision to obey norms.
I said before that norms are a way to solve the indeterminacy problem, and
I have argued elsewhere (Bicchieri 2006) that established norms are equilibria.
However, since social norms often go against our self-interest, especially when we
narrowly interpret self-interest as a desire for material incentives, a social norm
need not be an equilibrium of an ordinary game in which payoffs represent selfinterested preferences. Thus, for example, a cooperative norm cannot be a Nash
equilibrium of a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. If such a norm exists and is followed, however, the original PD game would be transformed (at least for the normfollowers) into the subsequent, very different game:
In the traditional PD, each player’s preference ranking is DC > CC > DD >
CD. B in Figure 6.4 stands for best, S for second best, and so on. In the symmetric
coordination game instead, each norm follower’s preference ranking is CC > DD
> DC > CD.23 That is, the players who follow a cooperative norm will do it because
their empirical and normative expectations have been met, hence they prefer to
obey the norm. The new coordination game has two strict Nash equilibria, one of
which is Pareto superior to the other.24, 25 When a norm of cooperation exists and is
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obeyed, a game like the PD above is transformed into a coordination game: Players’
payoffs in the new game will differ from the payoffs of the original game, since
their preferences and beliefs will be as in conditions 2, 2(a) and 2(b) or 2(b′) in the
Appendix. Indeed, if a player knows that a cooperative norm exists and expects a
sizeable part of the population to follow it, then, provided she also believes she is
expected (and maybe also prefers) to follow such norm, she will have a preference
to conform to the norm in a situation in which she has the choice to cooperate or to
defect. Note that what I am saying implies that a social norm, unlike a convention,
is never a solution of an original coordination game, though it is an equilibrium of
the new, transformed game it creates.
More formally, and to further illustrate the norm-based utility function introduced above, consider the PD we are discussing. The norm-based function for
either player is defined at C and undefined at D. The utility function for player 1 is
then the following:
U1 (C , C) = p 1 (C , C) − k1 (p 1 (C , C) − p 1 (C , C)) = p 1 (C , C)
U1 (D, D) = p 1 (D, D) − k1 (p 1 (D, D) − p 1 (D, D)) = p 1 (D, D)
U1 (C , D) = p 1 (C , D) − k1 (p 1 (C , C) − p 1 (C , D))
U1 (D, C) = p 1 (D, C ) − k1 (p 2 (C , C ) − p 2 (C , D))
Player 2’s utility function is similar. The game turns out to be a coordination
game with two equilibria when U1(D,C) < U1(C,C) and U2(D,C) < U2(C,C), that
is, when26
p 1 (D, C) − p 1 (C , C)
p 2 (C , C) − p 2 (C , D)
p (D, C) − p 2 (C , C)
k2 > 2
p 1 (C , C) − p 1 (C , D)
k1 >

Otherwise it remains a PD.
It is important to note that my definition of social norm does not entail that
everybody conforms. In fact, the definition (see Appendix) says that a social norm
may exist and not be followed. For some, the PD in our example is never trans-
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formed into any other game. And even a person who starts playing a coordination
game like the one described above may revert to playing the regular PD if she
realizes that empirical expectations have been violated. Let me clarify this point
with a simple example. Suppose an actor is faced with a finitely repeated PD, and
suppose the situation is such that a cooperative norm is primed. The player knows
there exists a cooperative norm that applies to this kind of situation. The player
also knows that there are several types of players, some of whom would not see
the game as he does. To make matters easy, suppose there are two types of players,
those who simply see the game as a PD, and those that follow a cooperative norm.27
In this case we may model the choice situation as a Bayesian game (Figure 6.5)
in which Nature picks a player type with a given probability, so that with prior
probability p the opponent one faces is playing a coordination game, and with
probability (1-p) he is playing a PD. If a norm-follower assesses a sufficiently high
probability to being matched with a similar type, he will cooperate.28
Note that, when faced with a defection, a player will reassess his probabilities,
and possibly revert to playing the equilibrium strategy (defect) for the traditional
PD. Thus, one might say that the existence of a norm always presents a conditional
follower with a Bayesian game: If the normative and empirical expectations conditions are fulfilled, she will attach a higher probability to being matched with a
similar player type (a norm follower), and act accordingly. But she must also be
prepared to revise her probabilistic assessment in case experience contravenes her
previous expectations.29 Note that the existence of a social norm facilitates equilibrium selection in the Bayesian game faced by the conditional norm’s followers.
If the probability of being matched with a similar type is high enough, C,C is the
selected equilibrium. Otherwise D,D will be selected.
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5. Conclusions
The search for better, empirically grounded theories of how agents make decisions has led experimental economists to make many new assumptions about what
motives guide us, and to incorporate these motives in utility functions. We are a
long way from designing utility functions that are general enough to capture the
richness of experimental data available. A promising way to proceed is to include
a truly social component into utility functions. An example is the introduction of
social norms, since their existence shapes our choices through the expectations
they generate. We can maintain a traditional rational choice model, but make
more interesting and realistic auxiliary hypotheses about preferences and motives.
Epistemic indeterminacy is mitigated by the existence of social norms since, as I
have argued, norms come in packages that include beliefs, expectations, causal
attributions, and so on. Strategic indeterminacy is mitigated, too, since the existence of a norm points to a specific equilibrium, allowing players to coordinate
on it. I use the term mitigate because players still have to assess their opponents’
sensitivity to the relevant norm, and their choice will depend on this assessment.
Experimental evidence, however, points to the fact that players, when a norm
applies to the situation they are in, tend, ceteris paribus, to have quite uniform
expectations of their opponents’ caring about it (they are expected to care) and
act accordingly in a uniform way.30 Bringing more empirical data of this kind into
our models is the only way I can see to solve the indeterminacy problem that has
plagued otherwise excellent choice models for too long.

Appendix: Conditions for a Social
Norm to Exist
Let R be a behavioral rule for situations of type S, where S can be represented as
a mixed-motive game. R is a social norm in a population P if there exists a sufficiently large subset Pcf # P such that, for each individual i [ Pcf :
Contingency: i knows that a rule R exists and applies to situations of type S;
Conditional preference: i prefers to conform to R in S on the condition that:
(a) Empirical expectations: i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P
conforms to R in S;
and either
(b) Normative expectations: i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P
expects i to conform to R in S;
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or
(b′) Normative expectations with sanctions: i believes that a sufficiently large
subset of P expects i to conform to R in S, prefers i to conform and may
sanction behavior.
A social norm R is followed by population P if there exists a sufficiently large
subset Pf # Pcf such that, for each individual i [ Pf , conditions 2(a) and either 2(b)
or 2(b′) are met for i and, as a result, i prefers to conform to R in S.

NOTES
1. By practical rationality I mean that an agent will choose that action that best
fulfi lls her goals, given her beliefs about the situation. By epistemic rationality I refer to
the rationality of an agent’s beliefs. This may simply mean that probabilistic beliefs obey
the axioms of probability calculus, but it may also mean that an agent will use all the
statistical data that are available to her (see Bicchieri 1993, Chapter 1)
2. In fact, we can even infer a person’s utility by looking at a sequence of choices she
made, provided we assume she is consistent. F. P Ramsey (1931) was the first to show how,
by observing a series of bets an individual is prepared to make, it is possible to infer both
her preferences and probabilistic beliefs.
3. An event p is common knowledge among the players if all the players know that p,
all know that all know that p, and so on. (Lewis 1969; Aumann 1976).
4. When players have common knowledge of the rules of the game and of their
mutual preferences, the game is one of complete information. In our example, if I does not
know y, or if I knows y but he does not know that II knows that, then the game is one of
incomplete information (Harsanyi 1967–1968).
5. Note that optimality is only conditional on a fi xed σ−i, not on all possible σ−i. A
strategy that is a best reply to a given combination of the opponents’ strategies may fare
poorly vis a vis another strategy combination.
6. One important virtue of Nash equilibrium is that for games with a finite
number of pure strategies and finitely many players, a Nash equilibrium always exists, at
least in mixed strategies (Nash 1951).
7. By contrast, p̂ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium if p̂T Ap̂ ≥ pT Ap̂ for all feasible p.
8. Note that (*) is a deterministic system, which allows some strategies to become
extinct, in the sense that pi(t) = 0 for some i,t. To prevent extinction, mutations are
added, but a discussion of how to modify (*) to include mutations and how to interpret
the latter would take us too far from the present topic. For an analysis of stochastic
models, see Foster and Young (1990).
9. Guth et al. (1982) were the first to observe that the most common offer by
proposers was to give half of the sum to the responder. The mean offer was 37 percent of
the original allocation. In a replication of their experiments, they allowed subjects to think
about their decision for one week. The mean offer was 32 percent of the sum, which is still
very high.
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10. We know that responders reject low offers even when the stakes are as high
as three months’ earnings (Cameron 1995). Furthermore, experiments in which third
parties have a chance to punish an unfair proposer at a monetary cost to themselves show
that (moderately) costly punishment is frequent (Fehr & Fishbacher 2000).
11. See Camerer (2003, Chapter 3) and Bicchieri (2006, Chapter 3).
12. Note, again, that the experiments I am referring to were all one-shot, which
means that the participants were fairly sure of not meeting again; therefore, punishing
behavior cannot be motivated as an attempt to convince the other party to be more
generous the next time around. Similarly, proposers could not be generous because they
were expecting reciprocating behavior in future interactions.
13. By social preference I refer to how people rank different allocations of material
payoffs to self and others.
14. The term max (xj —xi, 0) denotes the maximum of xj —xi and 0; it measures the
extent to which there is disadvantageous inequality between i and j.
15. The questions were devised by Jason Dana and Daylian Cain, who were taking
my course on social norms.
16. I have extensively discussed this point in Bicchieri (2006, Chapter 3)
17. T. Schelling (1960) presents several cases of ‘commitment strategies’ that help
one of the parties to get the upper hand in negotiating an agreement.
18. See, for example, Fehr et al. (2003), Dana, Weber et al (2003), Frey and Bohnet
(1995), Hoffman, McCabe et al. (1994), Bicchieri and Chavez (2007).
19. Bicchieri and Chavez (2007).
20. Intuitively, N2 should proscribe rejection of fair (or hyperfair) offers. The
incorporation of this consideration, however, will not make a difference in the formal
analysis.
21. Note that for 1<y<2, I knows II will only accept the low price.
22. When players are uncertain as to the type of player they are facing, they will
assess some probability that the other player is of a certain type. Typically, the list of all
possible types and their prior probability of occurring in the population are taken to be
common knowledge among the players (Harsanyi 1967, 1968).
23. For a justification of this ranking, see Bicchieri 2006, 16–19.
24. In a strict Nash equilibrium each player’s strategy is a unique best reply to the
other players’ strategies. This means that a strict Nash equilibrium cannot include weakly
dominated strategies.
25. A coordination game is a game in which there are at least two Nash equilibria in
pure strategies, and players have a mutual interest in reaching one of these equilibria (CC
or DD in our game), even if different players may prefer different equilibria (which is not
the case in the above example).
26. Note that U1(D,C) stands for the utility of player 1 when 1 plays D and 2 plays C.
Analogously, U2(D,C) stands for the utility of player 2 when 1 plays C and 2 plays D.
27. In a finitely repeated game, even a selfish’ player may want to cooperate for a while,
if it is not common knowledge that all players are rational and selfish (Kreps et al. 1982). This
consideration, however, has no bearing on my argument, since until a defection is observed a
player cannot distinguish between a forward-thinking selfish type and a true cooperator.
28. If players use an availability heuristic to come to this probability assessment, the
probability of playing a coordination game might initially be much higher. That is, if a
player is the type who follows a cooperative norm, that player tends to believe there is a
high probability that others are like him or her.
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29. Recent experiment I conducted showed that, even if subjects do not particularly
care about a (fairness) norm, their expectations about their partner’s sensitivity to it drive
their choices (Bicchieri & Chavez 2007). Moreover, we also discovered that subjects are very
sensitive to what other people in their situation have done, and when there is conflict between
normative and empirical expectations, the latter always win (Bicchieri & Xiao 2007).
30. Bicchieri and Chavez (2007), Bicchieri and Lev-on (2007).
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